Structural Shifts in the U.S. Labor Market

Thanks to the blog post “Update Employment: Population Ratio vs Unemployment Rate 2007-2014” written by J. Lyons Fund Management, Inc., who presented the inspirational chart as following. JLFMI commented that they would like to see closing of the gap between the Unemployment Rate and Employment to Population Ratio before getting optimistic about the whole labor market.

Employment to Population Ratio

We extended the chart back to 1948, which is the earliest year that the data could go back to within FRED’s database. It would be interesting to see how the chart would look like during the pre-depression era though.

Capture

The history of the U.S. labor market as depicted above can be separated into three periods of time: 1948-1973, 1974-2007, 2008-present; each of them represents a structurally different U.S. labor market.

Between 1948 and 1973: During post-WWII period, the Employment to Population Ratio had stayed between 55% and 58% after the structural distortions during the war. Meanwhile, the Unemployment Rate had stayed between approximately 3.0% and 8.0%. Based on the statistics provided by Bureau of Labor Statistics,  the huge gap between the Unemployment Rate and the Employment to Population Ratio was largely due to the fact that less than of the women joined the labor force before 1970s. Despite the gap, the two data series had strong correlation with each during each crisis and non-crisis period.

Between 1974-2007: The Unemployment Rate and the Employment to Population Ratio not only have strong correlation but also have very minimum gap in between the two data series. During this time period, the Employment to Population Ratio had increased in a fast pace due to the fact that more and more women joined the labor force.

Between 2008-Present: The Unemployment Rate started trending lower but the Employment to Population has so far remained flat after the decline during the financial crisis. The big cross between the Unemployment rate and Employment to Population Ratio has never happened since the beginning of this data set sourced from St. Louis Fed.

Only this time around, among all the other financial crises we had since 1948, the Employment to Population Ratio has not rebounded with the Unemployment Rate. This is a stagnant labor market that we are facing. It is the so called New Normal, as Bill Gross named. We believe that this trend will continue and create a huge gap between the Unemployment rate and Employment to Population Ratio like it was between 1947 to 1973 and there will not be strong correlation at all between the two data series as the current unhealthy labor market has so many distortions created by the Fed’s monetary policies and government’s fiscal policies. Based on our  observations and research of foreign labor markets, the strong correlation between two data series without a huge gap from 1980s-2007 indicate a more natural and relatively healthy labor market.

As one of Fed’s dual mandates is a low Unemployment Rate, not high Employment to Population Ratio (which is a more fundamental picture), the fundamentals of the deeply distorted labor market will continue to be ignored until the current sea of liquidity goes away. That’s when we see who is swimming naked.

 

Bonus Chart: Japanese Labor Market

Japanese Labor Market

 

 

An Observation of the Current Market with Reflexivity Theory

S&P 500 and VIX: Bearish on S&P 500 (expecting a major correction after or sometime before the Fed exits the current QE program) and Bullish on VIX (towards the end of the taper); Fed is likely to bring back the QE after negative economic fundamentals hit expectations without QE support, as of 06/29/2014

We often say predicting/forecasting the future is almost impossible, as there are various unknown factors that shape the future. However given the fact that the Federal Reserve has been constantly intervening financial markets, it makes the prediction of the long term trend of the financial markets easier than the past, as Fed’s actions/intentions have become the main source of factors in the markets; these policy actions have eliminated numerous factors from pricing any type of financial asset in a spontaneous order. This article is written to present an observation of the current market based on such distortions.

Reflexivity Theory 

Based on Reflexivity Theory developed by George Soros, the essential part of the market mechanism is the “lack of correspondence, the inherent divergence, between the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs” (Soros); until such expectations/views come back to the fundamental reality (such event may very likely be triggered by the Fed’s own ignorance), which it can go far from expected, riding the trend with the Fed’s monetary policies so far have been the right decisions. However, based on S&P 500 performance during the QE era shown on the chart below from DoubleLine Funds, every time period with no policy or every time period towards the end of QE policy has been volatile, such as the period between March 2010 and November 2010 and the period between July 2011 and November 2011.

Capture

Relationship between Equities and Bonds Under the QE Era

During the QE programs, the market participants expect that Fed is capable of supporting the economic recovery; therefore majority of participants allocate their assets from bonds to equities. When there is no such policy, the market participants fear of economic dip without Fed’s life support and fly into the so called “safe assets” (which will not be safe either). Between March 2010 and November 2010, when there was no QE program, the stock market had a major correction in April and May, and the 10-year U.S. treasury yield dropped by 126 bps as shown on the following chart from Double Line Funds. During QE2, S&P 500 increased by approximately 10%, however the 10-year treasury yield went up by 50 bps (inversely, the price dropped). Subsequently between May 2011 and September 2011, when there was no QE program, the stock market once again had a 11% correction and the 10-year treasury yield dropped by 130 bps. Between September 2011 and November 2013, the Fed did not end/exit the QE programs; the equity index increased from approximately 1200 to a high of approximately 1800, and the 10-year treasury yield increased from approximately 1.8% to approximately 2.8%. As soon as the Fed announced the taper plan, the 10-year treasury yield has dropped by 20 bps to 2.7% as of March 2014, as some of the market participants once again feared and flied into treasury securities.

Based on a recent article by WSJ, Global Macro hedge funds have been hurt and caught up with surprises of the drop of treasury yields. If one understands what has been happening to the relationship bewteen equities and bonds during the QE era, such price movements should not have been surprises and can be profited ahead of time.

Capture 1

Global Macro Funds Could Be Wrong, Once Again

Based on latest report from JP Morgan (reported by Zero Hedge), the rolling 21-day beta of Global Macro hedge funds, which represents the average exposure of such funds to equities over the last 21 days, have increased exponentially since the last month.  If “buy when Fed buys and sell when/before Fed sells” still stays true, then it seems like the Global Macro hedge funds in general have stepped into the wrong direction. Once again, the availability of massive cheap money provided by the Fed’s monetary policies, have distorted the healthy market reflections on the fundamentals so much, that investors investing based on the fundamentals (bearish) have been crushed by the bullish performance of equity indexes. In addition, the volatility, which the Global Macro funds have relied on to make money, has also been tamed by the Fed during the last couple years. However, Contrarian Capitalist thinks the volatility will come back towards the end of the taper, should the course of the taper continues. As a result based on discussions aforementioned, the U.S. equity market is likely to trend downward after (or sometime before) the Fed exits the current QE program.

Hedge Fund Monitor

Will the Fed Bring Back the QE?

Yes, very likely. But when? That is very hard to say, but it is likely to come after the hard and negative economic fundamentals, without QE to support, to crush market participants’ expectations of the recovery. The change of the expectations is likely to cause a major correction. As the the final revision of the 1Q14 U.S. GDP reports a negative growth rate of -2.9%, which represents the biggest drop since the recent recession in 2009. The shocked (of course) main stream economists blamed the drop on the severe weather conditions without questioning the fact that how severe weather conditions can have such negative impacts on the broad economy. Contrarian Capitalist thinks the market is likely to start pricing in the difference between reality (the economic recovery is a house of cards) and expectation in second half of 2014 or first half of 2015; the feedback loop of reflexivity mechanism will resume (Calandro). But, once again, we don’t know exactly when that will happen. If the Fed reverses the taper before it exits the whole program, in that case, the equity market might not have a correction; depending on the size of the continuing program, the market participants might expect the economy will continue to be supported by the QE program (based on reflexivity theory, the expectations can shape the reality to some extent), until such expectations change in the future.

U.S. GDP

Source:

Soros, George . “George Soros Theory of Reflexivity MIT Speech.” . The MIT Department of Economics World Economy, 26 Apr. 1994. Web. 29 June 2014. <http://churchandstate.org.uk/2011/04/george-soros-theory-of-reflexivity-mit-speech/&gt;.

Calandro, Joseph. “Reflexivity, Business Cycles, And The New Economy.” The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 7: 54. Mises Institute. Web. 29 June 2014.

Japan’s Lost Decade and Derailing Future

Japan’s Lost Decade & Derailing Future

Written by Contrarian Capitalist

Inspired by Kyle Bass, Hedge Fund Manager of Hayman Capital

Thesis:

This research report is meant to discuss the cause of the Japanese financial crisis, its lost decade in 1990s and the prediction of incoming crisis facing Japan. One cannot talk about a prediction without analyzing the history, therefore this paper integrates the historical analysis and future prediction together to give readers a more coherent and insightful view on Japanese macroeconomic issues. 

I. Introduction

Japan is a fascinating country in various aspects, such as culture, manners, spirit and its history. After World War II, Japan was one of the fastest countries which recovered from the war. It was almost hard to believe that Japan was defeated in the war when people saw the resilience in Japanese economy. After several decades of growth, the whole world thought Japan was going to take over the world and surpass U.S. pretty soon, which turned out to be untrue after 1990’s crisis. (The symbolic Imperial Palace at the peak of the bubble was worth more than the whole California’s real estate.) Japan fell off the cliff and after two decades, the economy never fully comes back. However, what’s worse is that a debt crisis and massive devaluation are not far away anymore as a lot of factors which kept it going for two decades are deteriorating intrinsically. Let us review the crisis below and let it lead to the main core of this report – incoming crash.

II. The Financial Crisis, Lost Decade and the Cause

The financial crisis and the lost decade

In 1990, Japan had one of the worst financial crises in human history. The wealth lost was equivalent to 2.7 years of GDP of the peak year during crisis, which was more than the damage that the Great Depression did to U.S.. [1]Nikkei 225 after two decades is still down 80% since it tripled its value to almost 40000 points. However, Yen appreciated from 350/dollar to 80/dollar in 40 years, regardless of the financial crisis. Japan’s GDP never contrasted until 1998 due to government’s aggressive fiscal spending.

It was real estate bubble mainly causing the crisis. As we all know, real estate is just a piece of an asset like commodity. It does not grow like a company but its price fluctuates due to supply and demand relationship. Sooner or later, the price would have to drop once the bubble is popped. As the chart shows below, land price soared to an outrageous level, four times the price of 1975 according to the index below, and then it dropped dramatically every year back to almost 1975 level in 2010.

 Image
[2]                                                                                                                     [3]
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[4]                                                                                                                     [5]

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                             [6]

After years of deflation, Japan’s decade was named after “the lost decade”. Deflation really started to hurt the economy since 1998. In order to cure the deflation, Bank of Japan started zero interest rate policy, however real interest rate kept above zero due to deflation. That was when quantitative easing got introduced. This could be well illustrated by MV=PY. If V remains the same, increase of M will increase P*Y. Therefore either demand or price or both have to go up. Even if demand doesn’t go up, certain level of inflation would create some inflation to plunge real rate to negative, [7] so that people can start borrowing and spending. Yet, it didn’t work too well either.

 Argument of causes for deflation

There are various arguments on reasons caused the deflation and the lost decade in Japan. Among those, there are three main and important ones: Keynesian school represented by Ben Bernanke, Austrian school represented by legendary investor Jim Rogers and Balance Sheet Recession proposed by Richard Koo. Although the history wouldn’t change and we would not know had different policies been implemented would improve Japan’s situation dramatically, it’s worthwhile to analyze each to see which makes more sense.

  • Keynesian School

Keynesian school represented by Bernanke has long been advocating government intervention and injecting liquidity into financial system during crisis are the correct ways to save an economy. However, Japan followed the theory to lower the interest rate below 1% and inject liquidity by launching quantitative easing. It didn’t work. Keynesians argue that it was because whatever Japan did was too little and too late. Interest rate wasn’t lowered until one year after the crisis [8]and quantitative easing wasn’t launched until 2001[9]. Therefore after 2008, with the lesson from Japan, both Bernanke and Obama implemented policies very fast to keep deflation out of the way and it has so far been successful. However, after five and half years, the recovery is painfully slow as unemployment still remains above 8% excluding a lot of discouraged people. Whether the actions were appropriate and useful remain to be seen, as U.S. fiscal situation deteriorates dramatically post-crisis. This theory overlooks that those bailed out banks would not learn the lessons, because they never did in the history unless they got punished or bankrupt. 2008 crisis was no different. Few got punished or put into jail as they should be. New financial regulations such as Dodd Frank and Volker Rule with 2000 pages are not really improving anything. [10]This is the potential risk of the next recession even if Keynesian theory does work.

  • Austrian School

Austrian school, as the oldest economic school advocates no-bailout policies, no government intervention, and completely let the free market work regardless of recession. Jim Rogers has compared with what U.S. did in 2008 to what happened to Japan several times publicly.[11] He considers what U.S. did was similar to Japan, such as bailing out zombie banks, quantitative easing, and zero-interest policy. U.S. is walking on the exact same road with a long-term fake recovery, to an eventual debt crisis like Europe and a dollar crisis due to printing large quantity of money. The appropriate way of coping with crisis is to pop the bubble and let the economy and unethical banks go bust, as this is the necessary cycle of a healthy economy. Short-term deep pain is much better than a long-term pain plus an eventual bust, since there can be no more kick-the-can-down-the-road solution. A good analogy is it’s like you are taking an antibiotic medicine to cure the cancer, which could relieve the pain temporarily but cure is never reachable. The trade-off of this theory is you have to bear through very deep pain for couple years.

  • Balance Sheet Recession

The Balance Sheet Recession was brought up by Richard Koo, the chief economist at Nomura Research Institute. Koo claims that monetary policies such as zero-interest policy and quantitative easing are not effective in balance sheet recession, as private sectors are busy with deleveraging and restoring confidence. Supply of money doesn’t meet with demand of money. Only fiscal policies work during that time to keep up the GDP. For example, Japan’s GDP never contracted until 1996 due to large amount of fiscal spending and Japan didn’t have deflation until 1998 when Asian crisis started. The reason why Japan started deflation, according to Koo, was the mistake Japan made to cut budget deficits, as European countries are killing themselves when cutting budget deficits. He emphasized that deflation was the result rather than the cause of balance sheet recession. [12]However, this theory overlooks the fact that deteriorating fiscal situation like Europe could bring the insolvency problem of government. It’s because European countries went out of control of their spending limit that they have to cut those spending now, as the market forces them to.

III. The Worst Fiscal Situation & the Incoming Crisis

Since the crisis in 1990, Japan has been able to kick the problem for two decades. What is a definition of a Ponzi scheme? Japan is a perfect example of Ponzi scheme. In order to keep the scheme (keep piling public debt) going, Japan needs deflation, which leads to low nominal interest rate.

Ponzi scheme:

Deflation =>Low interest rate=>Increasing Debt and interest payments=>Either tax more or borrow more to pay interest payments=>Taxing more from a shrinking economy is hard=>The only way out is borrowing more=>Deflation and low interest rate have to exist=> When market stops believing the story, the scheme will be broken. [13]

Japan’s debt is intrinsically digested. 95% of its debt is owned by Japanese. [14]Therefore people argue that due to low interest rate and ability to borrow money, Japanese government can keep this going virtually as long as it wants. Even if it blows up, Japan can print however much money they want to pay the interest, just as what Federal Reserve did.

However, I counter argue that Japan’s fiscal problem is going to break down due to several reasons:

The contest of printing press

Printing money to pay debt is a fallacy. However, it’s hard to believe former chairman of Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan said exactly the same thing. If it’s true, then the world will be in total disorder. Nobody will ever follow the rules, because it’s just a pure contest of printing presses rather than disciplines. The only reason human beings have been using gold as currency for thousands of years is people can’t print gold as its scarcity. Money is only as good as your belief in it, as Adam Smith put.

Aging population:

Japan’s population peaked in 2005 with more than 120 million people and would start trending down as The Japanese Journal of Population predicted. By the time of 2055, Japan’s population level will return to the level in 1955 after 100 years. According to Japanese Journal of Population, 40% of total population will be 65 years or older, working-age population will count 50%, and child population will count as 40%[15]. As a result, pension funds have been selling their funds to cover the pension redemption for more people retiring. The holding of JGBs from pension funds has decreased 3% in recent years as the chart shows. Social security counts the biggest part of expenditure in both FY2011 and FY2012, implying the government is spending a lot of money to take care of older people.

Image

                 [16]                                                                                                   [17]

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              [18]                                                                                                      [19]

Fiscal situation deteriorating dramatically:

  • Budget and JGB issuance:

Image

      [20]

The table above shows the budget situation for FY 2011 and FY2012. Under the column of FY2012, it’s obvious that the government bond issues are more than tax revenue collected and what’s worse is that half of the tax revenue will be used to service debt. Japan’s total budget expenditure for FY 2012 is around 90 trillion yen, which is around 1.1 trillion dollars. Around 62% of tax revenue is dedicated to social security. The fiscal situation will only get worse, since the government has to keep borrowing more to pay interest. Banks are the ones who hold the most of JGBs, so if an event like default happens, they are going to suffer the most. [21] The chart below shows the gap between tax revenue and total expenditures have been widening since 1990’s crisis, as the government increased fiscal spending to fuel the GDP every year and borrowed more to pay back interest payment.

Image

[22]

In FY 2012, Japan is planning to issue initial plan of 174 trillion yen worth of bonds, which breaks the record of any previous initial plans. Every year, Japan has to issue over a hundred trillions yen of refunding bonds to fund the redemption of matured debt.

Image

             [23]                                                                                                       [24]
  • Interest rate, interest payment and debt service

Interest payment in FY 2012 is about 9.8 trillion yen, 10.9% of total expenditures. Since tax revenue collected counts only 50% of total expenditures, then interest payment counts 20% of tax revenue. Therefore interest payment will match Japan’s tax revenue when interest rate weighted average goes up to 5% from current 1%. Debt service counts 50% of tax revenue will match tax revenue when interest rate weighted average goes up to 2% from 1%.

Image

                                             [25]

  • Comparison to other countries

Japan has the worst fiscal situation on this planet. It has around 11 trillion dollars public debt, more than 200% debt to GDP and average of $86262 debt per person. [26]In contrast, countries like Australia, Poland, Mexico and Sweden have very small public debt and relatively low debt to GDP. The European countries are not much worse than U.S., indicating the fiscal problem in U.S. is worrisome as well.

Manufacturing slowing down and energy disruption:

  • Manufacturing slowing down

Manufacturing has been slowing since the rebound from 2008. Industrial production goes to the level much lower than the pre-crisis level. Most importantly, business confidence fell to negative area. Image

[27]

Small enterprises (non-manufacturing) are particularly worse, falling to -25% in the beginning of 2011. According to METI, the number of manufacturing companies dropped to one third from 1996 to 2006 and the share of manufacturing of whole economy dropped from 35% in 1970s to 18% in 2009. [28]A very big reason of slowing down is coming from the competence of low priced Chinese goods.

  • Energy disturbance, trade deficit

Due to the earthquake and tsunami, Japan stopped almost all of its nuclear operators used to supply energy, and replace it with imports of natural gas. The strength of Yen also contributes to the Japan’s first annual deficit, 32 billion dollars, since 1980, which is before 1990’s crisis and this deficit is unlikely to reverse for the next couple years as Japan continues importing natural gas. [29] This will definitely start hurting the already fragile economy.

IV. Similarities and Differences from Recent Financial Crisis in U.S.

There are a lot of similarities and differences between 2008 crisis in U.S. and 1990 crisis in Japan.

Cause of the crash

Both crashes happened due to real estate bubble and real estate bubble was caused mainly of low interest rate environment. Notice how similar the shape of target interest rate during 1990 crisis and 2008 crisis and how correlated U.S. housing prices and Japan’s were with each other.

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             [30]                                                                                                    [31]

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[32]

Monetary policies and fiscal policies

  • Monetary policies:

Although monetary policies were basically the same, timing and speed were very different. Bank of Japan raised interest rate during crisis, and then it started lowering the interest rate in 1991. The interest rate wasn’t lowered to below 1% until 1995. Federal Reserve in contrast started lowering interest in the beginning of crisis and it got lowered to below 1% after couple months. Japan so far has kept its interest rate low for 15 years and Federal Reserve has kept its target rate low for about 5 years and plan for another 2 years. Whether it will take longer to get out of zero-interest rate policy for U.S. still remains to be seen. Bank of Japan didn’t start quantitative easing until 2001, which was fairly ineffective on getting Japan out of deflation, compared to 2009 for U.S.. From the MP, IS, and AD curve perspectives, Fed was shifting the MP curve down right after the crisis, because Bernanke was expecting deflation coming regardless the inflation at that time. IS curve moves down along the curve. AD curve shifts to the right as creating more demand theoretically.

  • Fiscal Policies

In terms of fiscal policies, Ministry of Japan and U.S. Treasury were both having stimulus plans after the crisis to make up decreased demand from private sectors. From macroeconomic analysis point of view, Y=C+G+I+NX. If you can make up the C and I with larger G, the economy wouldn’t contrast too much. Those aggressive fiscal policies massively piled the debt owed by the government.

Impacts and effects

  • Japanese wealth evaporated in asset collapse was about 2.7 years’ worth of GDP, which is worse than the Great Depression[33]
  • U.S. households lost 10 trillion dollars of wealth during 2008 crisis, which is around one year of GDP at that time.
  • Japan started the thirteen-year deflationary period since 1998, but U.S. never had deflationary period, as Bernanke learned from Japan’s lesson by pumping massive liquidity very fast. However, whether the speed and quantity were the cause of the deflation in Japan remains debatable, since deflation didn’t start right after 1990, but after Asian crisis started and Japan started to cut budget in 1996 as told from the chart on page 7. 

V. Conclusion and Caution:

The crisis is unlikely to come very soon, as Japan is such a large economy and a lot of people still believe in Japanese bond market to work, but it will likely be within the next 3-5 years. European debt crisis and China’s slowdown could accelerate the situation faster than I estimate. Confidence builds slowly but collapses very fast, as we can conclude from stock indexes during crisis. The stock index climbs up on stairs during the bull market but falls over a cliff in the bear market, and that happens to normal human behavior as well. People tend to have false optimism to believe in the government and central bank will act on its duty and they should be fine. It’s this false optimism that fuels the bubble and the pain after crash. That’s why average people are the ones who always can’t make money and lose money in financial markets. When they get there, the smart money already moves to the next place. As media hasn’t shifted its focus on this gigantic hole of Japanese fiscal situation, getting ahead of the crash is still possible. Hopefully, the readers who are reading this research report can turn cautious and prudent on the matter and act correspondingly.

 

Reference:

Koo, Richard. Balance Sheet Recession, Japan’s Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global Implications. 1st. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2003. p13. Print.

Land prices in Japan, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011

Hutchison, Michael. Japan’s Great Stagnation: Financial and Monetary Policy Lessons for Advanced Economies. 1st. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. p163. Print.

Interest Rate Japan Long Term chart – JP Target Rate. N.d. Photograph. About Inflation

Berkmen, Perlin. “Bank of Japan’s Quantitative and Credit Easing: Are They Now More Effective?.” IMF Working Paper. IMF, n.d. Web. 23 Apr 2012.

Rogers, Jim. Internet Chat Interview. June/ 2011.

Koo, Richard. Balance Sheet Recession, Japan’s Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global Implications. 1st. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2003. P1-13. Print.

Epstein, Gene. “The Big Flaws in Dodd-Frank.” Barron. 14 04 2012: n. page. Web. 23 Apr. 2012. <http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111904857404577342680482638196.html

Xie, Andy. “The Yen’s Looming Day of Reckoning.”Caixin. Caixin, 23032012. Web. 21 Apr 2012. <http://english.caixin.com/2012-03-23/100372177_all.html&gt;.

Kaneko, Ryuichi. “Population Projections for Japan: 2006-2055 Outline of Results, Methods, and Assumptions.” Japanese Journal of Population. 6.1 (2008): p88-89. Web. 23 Apr. 2012. <http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-

Japan. Ministry of Finance. FY2011 Debt Management Policies. 2011. Web. < http://www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/publication/debt_management_report/2011/index.htm>.

Japan. Ministry of Finance. FY2011 Debt Management Policies. 2010. Web. < http://www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/publication/debt_management_report/2010/index.htm>.

Japan. Ministry of Finance. FY2011 Debt Management Policies. 2009. Web. < http://www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/publication/debt_management_report/2009/index.htm>.

Japan. Ministry of Finance. FY2011 Debt Management Policies. 2008. Web. < http://www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/publication/debt_management_report/2008/index.htm>.

Japan. Ministry of Finance. FY2011 Debt Management Policies. 2007. Web. < http://www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/publication/debt_management_report/2007/index.htm>.

Japan. Ministry of Finance. Highlights of the Budget for FY2012. 2011. Web. <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/budget/fy2012/e20111224a.pdf&gt;.

Elefint Designs. Debt Crisis: Japan. 2012. Chart. Glassman Wealth Services. Web. 23 Apr 2012. <http://www.glassmanwealth.com/japan-the-global-economy’s-elephant-in-the-room/&gt;.

“OECD Economic Surveys Japan.” OECD. OECD, April 2011. Web. 23 Apr 2012. <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org.avoserv.library.fordham.edu/docserver/download/fulltext/1011081e.pdf?expires=1335209498&id=id&accname=ocid45123181&checksum=746050D3F5878514A4BD2F78A5436B01&gt;.

Fackler, Martin. “Declining as a Manufacturer, Japan Weighs Reinvention.” New York Times. (2012): n. page. Web. 23 Apr. 2012.

Nakamichi, Nakashi. “Japan Posts First Trade Deficit Since ’80.” Wall Street Journal. (2012): n. page. Web. 23 Apr. 2012.

Effective Fed Funds Rate, FRED, 2012 research.stlouisfed.org

Koo, Richard. “The world in balance sheet recession: causes, cure and politics.” Nomura Research Institute. (2011): p1. Print.

 


[1] Koo p13

[2] Bloomberg

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

[7] Hutchison p163

[8] Aboutinflation.com

[9] Berkmen, p13

[10] Epstein, The Big Flaws in Dodd-Frank

[11] Wall Street Journal, The Big Interview

[12] Koo, p1-13

[13] Xie, The Yen’s Looming Day of Reckoning

[14] Debt Management Report 2011, Japan Ministry of Finance

[15] Kaneko p88-89

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19] Debt Management Report, 2007 -2012, Japan Ministry of Finance

[20] Highlights of the Budget for FY2012, Japan Ministry of Finance

[21] Debt Management Report 2011, Japan Ministry of Finance

[22] Highlights of the Budget for FY2012, Japan Ministry of Finance

[23] Ibid

[24] Ibid

[25] Highlights of the Budget for FY2012, Japan Ministry of Finance

[26] Elefint Designs & Glassman Wealth Services

[27] OECD Economic Surveys

[28] Fackler

[29] Nakamichi

[30] Aboutinflation.com

[31] FRED

[32] Koo p 1

[33] Koo, p13